Crime Comics; Zoning and the Exclusion of Churches; Recognition of Red Chin in order to Deport Alien; Anti-Miscegenation Statute; Right to Vote by unknown
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 5 
Number 3 Volume 5, Summer 1959, Number 3 Article 11 
June 2016 
Crime Comics; Zoning and the Exclusion of Churches; Recognition 
of Red Chin in order to Deport Alien; Anti-Miscegenation Statute; 
Right to Vote 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the Catholic Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
(1959) "Crime Comics; Zoning and the Exclusion of Churches; Recognition of Red Chin in order to Deport 
Alien; Anti-Miscegenation Statute; Right to Vote," The Catholic Lawyer: Vol. 5 : No. 3 , Article 11. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol5/iss3/11 
This Recent Decisions and Developments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
RECENT DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS
Crime Comics
In recent years much attention has been
focused upon the relationship between the
ever-increasing sale of crime comic books
and the concomitant increase in juvenile
delinquency.' As a result of one such in-
quiry, Los Angeles County, California en-
acted an ordinance2 making the sale and
circulation of such comics to children un-
der the age of eighteen a misdemeanor.
After an extensive preamble indicating the
legislative findings as to the danger crime
comics pose to the young, the ordinance
proscribed the depiction in comic book
form of several enumerated crimes such as
arson, murder, rape and kidnapping. News-
papers and accounts of historical or scrip-
tural occurrences were excepted.
The constitutionality of the ordinance
-was recently upheld by the California Dis-
strict Court of Appeal in Katzev v. County
of Los Angeles.3 The plaintiffs, magazine
dealers, sought declaratory relief claiming
that the ordinance violated the federal con-
stitution4 as an infringement of "Freedom
of the Press."
The CoIrt declined to base its decision
1 See Interim Report of the Subcommittee to
Investigate Juvenile Delinquency to the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1955).
2 Los Angeles County, Cal., Ordinance No. 6633.
3 336 P.2d 6 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
4 The plaintiffs put forth several grounds, prin-
cipally lack of clear and present danger, over-
broadness and vagueness. Id. at 9.
on the ground that the subject of the or-
dinance was beyond the area of constitu-
tionally protected speech.' The mere fact
that such publications "do not form an
essential. part of any exposition of ideas
[and] . ..have a very slight, social value
as a step toward truth .. ."6 has been held
insufficient to withdraw them from the pro-
tection of the "preferred status" of First
Amendment freedoms. 7
Having rejected the argument that crime
and horror comics were in a constitutionally
unprotected category, the Court then had
to deal with the determinants of the per-
missibility of legislation restricting freedom
of the press, chiefly the implications of
the "clear and present danger" test. This
phrase has had a history of such varied
application,8 the greatest variations occur-
ring in its place of origin, the Supreme
Court,9 that it is perhaps inaccurate to
refer to it as a "test." Its present mode of
"[Ilt is our opinion that the time has not yet
arrived to declare [crime comic books] .. .per se
beyond the protection of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments." Id. at 10.
6 CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES
150 (1941).
7 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
"Though we can see nothing of any possible value
to society in these magazines, they are as much
entitled to the protection of free speech as the
best of literature." Id. at 510.
8 See Corwin, Bowing out "Clear and Present
Danger," 27 NOTRE DAME LAW. 325 (1952).
9 Compare Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252
(1941), with Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949). See-Corwin, supra note 8.
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application today was enunciated by Judge
Learned Hand and adopted by the Su-
preme Court in Dennis v. United States:"
"In each case [courts] must ask whether
the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of
free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger."" The value of the interest sought
to be protected, and the extent to which it
is threatened is now balanced against the
value of the expression to be restricted.
Several factors enter into the interest-
balancing process. The nature of the utter-
ance under consideration is of importance.
Although the Supreme Court in Winters
v. New York12 decided that publications of
no apparent value to society are not be-
yond the protection of the First Amend-
ment, it is reasonable to place a different
value in any balancing process upon a
crime comic book than upon an expres-
sion, the appeal of which is to reason.1 3
In addition, the degree of control the state
is pernitted to exercise, even in restricting
First Amendment liberties, is undoubtedly
increased by the fact that the ordinance is
directed toward the protection of children.
In Prince v. Massachusetts14 the Court
said: "A democratic society 'rests, for
its continuance, upon the healthy, well-
rounded growth of young people into full
maturity as citizens, with all that implies.
It may secure this against impeding re-
straints and dangers within a broad range
of selection." 1 The fact that the ordinance
10 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
11 Id. at 510.
12 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
13 See Nietmotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
14 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
15 Id. at 168; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931).
imposes a post-publication penalty rather
than a prior restraint is also significant in
view of the disfavor with which the Su-
preme Court has looked upon efforts at
suppression prior to publication. 16
An important consideration in dealing
with legislation restrictive of free speech is
the division of responsibility between the
legislature and the court in determining
whether a certain type of expression pro-
duces evil results. As the present case in-
dicated, it is not the function of the court
to debate the wisdom of the legislative
determination that crime comic books can
cause a moral deterioration in the young
and a resultant tendency toward juvenile
delinquency. In an area where the psycho-
logical data is so inconclusive, and the
experts so divided, the policy decision is
the legislature's, not the court's. This is
not to say that the court cannot, in a due
process case, find that the legislative infer-
ences from available data are so unreason-
able and arbitrary as to be invalid. It is
submitted that the court's share of the
responsibility is to accept the legislative
judgment of the causal relationship be-
tween crime comics and societal evil as
valid if not unreasonable, not to accept it
as valid only if convinced it is sound.17
Of course the resolution of the single ques-
tion of the deleterious effect of crime
comics does not decide the case. The court
must then resolve the proper judicial issue;
i. e., whether, as a conclusion of the bal-
ance of interests, the danger apprehended
16 See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925).
17 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
539-40 (1951 ). (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See
also Richardson, Freedom O Expression and The
Function Of Courts, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1951).
does not outweigh the suppression pro-
posed and thus offends the due process
clause. s
It will be noted that the present case is
an action for declaratory relief, not a crim-
inal prosecution under the ordinance. Thus
the ordinance could not be invalidated on
the Holmes-Brandeis theory of an evi-
dentiary requirement of a clear and pres-
ent danger "as applied," 19 for the simple
reason that the ordinance is here being
applied to no one. For it to be invalidated
in a declaratory action it must be shown
to be void "on its face." The conclusion
of the court in the present case was: "What
we have here is a situation wherein the
effect of an ordinance upon the exercise of
freedom of the press is relatively small in
contrast with the public interest to be pro-
tected, one of great magnitude. '20
However, independent of the considera-
tions that determine the issue when the
ordinance is considered in the abstract, a
different problem will arise when an indi-
vidual is prosecuted for selling a crime
comic book to a minor. How then, should
clear and present danger be applied? While
admittedly a defendant is entitled to show
that the apprehended danger does not war-
rant the proposed suppression, he should
18 Cf. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 500-03
(1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
19 See Gitlow v. New York, supra note 16, at
672-73. (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,574-79 (1927)
(Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., concurring). Since
the decisions in these cases the Court has ac-
cepted the Holmes-Brandeis approach, requiring
that wherever speech was the evidence of a crime,
a showing of a clear and present danger of im-
pending evil was necessary. See Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
20 Katsev v. County of Los Angeles, 336 P.2d 6,
19 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
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not be able to disassociate himself from the
class of harmful publications into which
he has been reasonably included by the
legislature, and contend that this magazine
which he sold was not clearly and pres-
ently dangerous to society. 21 It is obvious
that no single crime comic poses a signifi-
cant threat to-society, but rather it is the
mass of such comics that causes concern.
Hence it would be unrealistic and self-
defeating for the court to apply a strictly
here and now "in personam" test without
taking notice of the dumulative effect of
the prohibited matter. The better approach
would be to heed the counsel of flexibility
given by the Court in the Dennis case, 22
and determine whether the danger as seen
by the legislature justifies the application
of the ordinance to an individual within
the class.
Having reached the conclusion that it is
permissible to restrict the sale of crime
comic books in order to preserve the moral
fiber of the young and to combat incentives
to crime, the technical problem of draft-
ing suitable legislation is presented. It has
proven to be a difficult task to write laws
that are effective, yet neither vague nor
21 This contention would be logically permissible
under the Holmes-Brandeis philosophy. See Den-
nis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 506 (1951),
where the Court interpreted the Holmes-Brandeis
philosophy as insisting "that wherever speech was
the evidence of the violation, it was necessary to
show that the speech created the 'clear and present
danger' of the substantive evil which the legisla-
ture had the right to prevent." Ibid. (Emphasis
added.)
22 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951). The Court recog-
nized that a phrase has meaning only when asso-
ciated with the considerations that gave birth to
its nomenclature and that it should not be applied
mechanically without regard to the circumstances
of each case.
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too broad in scope. In Winters v. New
York,2  the Supreme Court invalidated the
statute which made it a misdemeanor to
sell any magazine "principally made up of
... accounts of criminal deeds . . . blood-
shed, lust or crime." The Court, comment-
ing on the construction given the statute
by the state, remarked: "Collections of
tales of war horrors, otherwise unexcep-
tionable, might well be found to be
'massed' so as to become 'vehicles for in-
citing violent and depraved crimes.' Where
a statute is so vague as to make criminal
an innocent act, a conviction under it can-
not be sustained. '24 Thus it appears that
a statute construed in terms of tendency
will have little chance of survival.
Another line over which the legislature
must not step is that of overbroadness. If
legislation purports to restrict expressions
beyond constitutional bounds, as well as
those within such bounds, it is invalid as
to all. For example, in Butler v. Michi-
gan 2"5 the Supreme Court invalidated a
statute which forbade the sale to anyone
of magazines tending to incite minors to
violent or depraved acts. The statute drew
the following comments from the Court:
"Surely this is to burn the house to roast
the pig. . . .We have before us legislation
not reasonably restricted to the evil with
which it is said to deal. The incidence of
this enactment is to reduce the adult pop-
ulation of Michigan to reading only what
is fit for children." 26
Legislative efforts to steer between the
shoals of vagueness and the reefs of over-
2: 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
24 Id. at 520.
25 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
2 0 Id. at 383.
broadness resulted in the preparation of a
model comic book ordinance by the Na-
tional Institute of Municipal Law Offi-
cers. 27 Section 7-603 of the ordinance rec-
ommends that several factors be present:
(1) Specifically designate the persons
within its scope.
(2) Concern itself only with children
under eighteen.
(3) Require that illustration be essen-
tial to the offense.
(4) Specifically designate the prohib-
ited matter.
(5) Specifically cover a popular type
of publication which the preamble
purports to condemn and thus har-
monize purpose and effect.
(6) Exclude accounts of crime that are
part of the ordinary and general
dissemination of news.
(7) Exclude legitimate historical ac-
counts.
The ordinance considered in the prin-
cipal case incorporates all of the recom-
mendations of the model ordinance. It is
felt that the decision in the principal case
is a reflection of judicial tolerance of a pru-
dent legislative attempt to cope with ma-
terial categorized by Dr. Frederic Wertham
as the "new pornography" 28 and by Chief
Justice Vanderbilt of the Supreme Court of
New Jersey, as "Our greatest concern with
the upcoming generation .... ,, 29
27 National Institute of Municipal Law Offices,
NIMLO Model Comic Book Ordinance; edited by
Charles S. Rhyne (1954). Set forth in FEDER,
COMIC BOOK REGULATION 57 (1955).
28 WERTHAM, SEDUCTION OF THE INNOCENT
(1954).
29 Vanderbilt, Impasses In Justice, WASH. U.L.Q.
267, 302 (1956).
Zoning and tie Exclusion of Churches
The exclusion of churches through zon-
ing was highlighted in the recent Missouri
case of Congregation Temple Israel v. City
of Creve Coeur,1 decided in the Supreme
Court of that state. Plaintiff sought to build
a temple to use for religious worship, Sun-
day school and other church purposes in a
use district restricted to single family dwell-
ings. The plaintiff made application to the
local board for a variance as provided for
in the zoning ordinance. 2 This was refused.
Plaintiff contended that the ordinance pro-
vided no adequate standards as a guide to
the board's decision and that' interference
with the use of the property constituted a
restraint on religious freedom, and a denial
of equal protection. The board relied on the
state enabling act which empowered munic-
ipalities to regulate the "location and use of
buildings, structures and land for trade, in-
dustry, residence or other purposes." The
Court held that in view of the strong consti-
tutional guaranty of religious worship, the
state enabling act cannot be construed so
broadly as to permit regulation of churches.
The extension of state power to include
the enacting of zoning legislation is of recent
origin. It was not until 1926 in the case of
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.3 that
the constitutional validity of a comprehen-
sive zoning plan was put in issue. The Su-
preme Court held that zoning legislation in
its general scope is not arbitrary and so is
a proper subject of the state's power. 4 While
giving this blanket approval to zoning laws
generally, the Court pointed out that the
validity of a specific regulation must be
1 320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. 1959).
" Creve Coeur, Mo., Ordinance 105, June 23,
1954.
3 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
4 Id. at 395.
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determined by the facts in each case.' The
test for determining the validity of each
regulation is its "substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or general wel-
fare." Thus in a 1928 case, the Court held
that the action of the zoning authorities as
applied to the particular land involved had
no substantial relation to the general welfare
and as such violated the due process guar-
anties of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
The Supreme Court in the Village of
Euclid case specifically omitted from its
consideration the validity of zoning laws
with respect to churches and schools, 7 and
since then has never explicitly passed on
the issue. 8 Most of the state court decisions
which have refused to uphold the exclusion
of churches by zoning have recognized that
churches like other places of assembly pro-
duce noise, congestion, and traffic hazards,
but regard these effects as offset by the social
and moral values inherent in religious insti-
tutions.9 Such state court holdings appear
to be quite in line with the opinion of the
-Supreme Court as expressed in Village of
Euclid case:
It is not meant by this, [validating of zon-
ing laws] however, to exclude the possi-
bility of cases where the general public in-
terest would so far outweigh the interest of
5 Ibid.
6 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183
(1928).
7 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 385 (1926).
8 Congregation Temple Israel v. City of Creve
Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451,455 (Mo. 1959); see Cor-
poration of Latter-Day Saints v. City of Porter-
ville, 338 U.S. 805 (1949), where the problem
was specifically presented but the appeal was
dismissed for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion.
9 See, e.g., Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd.,
I N.Y. 2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827 (1956); State ex
rel. Synod of United Lutheran Church v. Joseph,
139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E.2d 515 (1942).
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the municipality that the municipality would
not be allowed to stand in the way. 10
Although interference with the constitu-
tional guaranty of freedom of religious wor-
ship would seem to be the most likely basis
for holding the exclusion of churches to be
unconstitutional, the premise most com-
monly used by the courts is that the ex-
clusion of churches bears no substantial
relation to public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare and therefore constitutes a
deprivation of property without due process
of law." Since zoning ordinances must meet
such strict due process requirements, ordi-
nances that absolutely restrict churches with-
out allowing for variances are infrequent
and usually have been declared invalid. A
Michigan court held such an enactment to
be unconstitutional on its face as being un-
reasonable and an arbitrary exercise of the
police power.12
In most of the cases, the ordinances in-
volved did not flatly exclude churches from
residential areas but required that special
permits be obtained from an administrative
board before they would be allowed." Such
ordinances, at times, grant discretion to the
administrative board but provide no express
standards or limitations on the board's exer-
cise of that discretion. The courts have held
that zoning ordinances which provide no
express standards or limitations on the
10 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra
note 7, at 390.
11 Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur Co. of
Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115
(1954) (no relation to general welfare); Brandtis
School v. Village of Lawrence, 184 N.Y.S.2d 687
(Sup. Ct. 1959) (denial of due process).
12 Mooney v. Village of Orchard Lake, 333 Mich.
389,53, N.W.2d 308 (1952).
i- See, e.g., State ex rel. Anshe Chesed Congre-
gation v. Bruggemeier, 97 Ohio App. 67, 115
N.E.2d 65 (1953).
board's discretion are violative of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment since the discretion may be exercised
in a purely arbitrary manner or in the in-
terest of a favored few. 1 4 Also, zoning
ordinances which are so vague as to leave
decisions to the whim or caprice of the
administrative agency have been held un-
constitutional by state courts."'
The problem of administrative discretion
is complicated by the fact that it is difficult
to draft a statute which embodies sufficient
definiteness to insure uniform discretionary
action by the local board.' 6 An ordinance
which permits an administrative body to
exclude churches on grounds of public wel-
fare or convenience might be regarded as
sufficiently definite, but the majority of
courts nevertheless find that a church adds
to the public convenience and welfare and
will not exclude churches on such grounds. 17
The words of the court in State ex rel. Synod
of United Lutheran Church v. Joseph18 typi-
fies the attitude of the courts:
The church in our American society has
traditionally occupied the role of both
teacher and guardian of morals. Restric-
tions against churches could therefore
scarcely 'be predicated upon a purpose to
protect public morals .... Fully to accom-
plish its great religious and social function,
the church should be integrated into the
home life of the community which it serves.
14 Pentecostal Holiness Church v. Dunn, 248 Ala.
314, 27 So.2d 561 (1946).
1" City of West Palm Beach v. State ex rel.
Duffey, 158 Fla. 863, 30 So.2d 491 (1947); Con-
cordia Collegiate Inst. v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189,
93 N.E.2d 632 (1950).
N( State ex rel. Ludlow v. Guffey, 306 S.W.2d 552
(Mo. 1957).
17 Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d
508, 136 NE.2d 827 (1956). See also, West Hart-
ford Methodist Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals,
143 Conn. 263, 121 A.2d 640 (1956).
18 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E.2d 515 (1942).
• . . To require that churches be banished
into the business district . . . is clearly not
to be justified on the score of promoting
the general welfare.16
The Supreme Court in a recent condem-
nation case gave a much broader construc-
tion to the concept of general welfare.2
0
The Court justified the taking of property
on aesthetic considerations for the mainte-
nance of an attractive and beautiful com-
munity. It has been argued that under this
broad construction of public welfare, the
undesirable incidences of having a church
in the neighborhood might be sufficient to
permit its exclusion on grounds of public
welfare. 21 However, no state court has been
found to have availed itself of a broad con-
struction of public welfare as a basis for
excluding churches. 22
Zoning ordinances have provided more
specific standards than the term "public wel-
fare." For example, administrative boards
have been empowered to exclude a church
if it causes depreciation of the surrounding
property values, or if it lacks adequate
parking facilities, or if a certain percentage
of the people in the community object to
it. Although depreciation of property values
has not usually been a valid basis for ex-
cluding churches, 23 a recent case held that,
19 ld. at 248-49, 39 N.E.2d at 524.
20 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
21 Churches and Zoning, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1428
(1957)..
22 See, e.g., Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd.,
I N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 826 (1956); Brandeis
School v. Village of Lawrence, 184 N.Y.S.2d 687
(Sup. Ct. 1959). The Berman case, supra note 20,
was cited in West Hartford Methodist Church v.
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 143 Conn. 263, 121 A.2d
640 (1956), but the court still refused to exclude
the church on grounds of public welfare.
23 See, e.g., State ex rel. Anshe Chesed Congrega-
tion v. Bruggemeier, 97 Ohio App. 67, 115 N.E.2d
65 (1953).
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among other reasons, it was a valid factor.24
The lack of adequate parking facilities has
been considered to be outweighed by the
social values of religion and the strong
guaranty of religious worship.2 However,
a church must comply with ordinary build-
ing, fire, and sanitary standards. 26 Stand-
ards based on the objection or approval of
a percentage of the people in a community
are invalid as an arbitrary and uncontrolled
violation of property rights.27
The peace, comfort and quiet of a resi-
dential area is a definite social value in our
American society. Accordingly, a distinction
might be drawn between ordinances which
exclude churches from limited areas in
residential neighborhoods and ordinances
which exclude them from an entire town.
Exclusion of churches from limited areas
may be justified where reasonable alterna-
tive locations exist. Although such ordi-
nances would involve a difficult question of
degree, the Supreme Court has permitted
slight interferences with First Amendment
freedoms.2 8
24 West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Bd.
of Appeals, 143 Conn. 263, 121 A.2d 640 (1956).
25 See, e.g., Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur
Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, 117
N.E.2d 115 (1954).
26 Community Synagogue v. Bates, 1 N.Y.2d 445,
136 N.E.2d 488 (1956); City of Sherman v.
Simms, 143 Tex. 115, 183 S.W.2d 415 (1944).
27 Washington ex rel. Seattle Trust Co. v. Ro-
berge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
28 In American Communications Assn., CIO v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 397-98 (1950), the Court
said, "When the effect of a statute or ordinance
upon the exercise of First Amendment freedoms
is relatively small and the public interest to be
protected is substantial, it is obvious that a rigid
test requiring a showing of imminent danger to
the security of the Nation is an absurdity. We
recently dismissed for want of substantiality an
appeal in which a church group contended that
its First Amendment rights were violated by a
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Private agreements restricting the use of
property to exclude churches are unani-
mously enforced.2" The courts hold that
such private restrictions are not void as
against public policy, explaining that the
right of a church to acquire property rests
on no higher ground than that of a private
citizen.8 0 Thus courts have allowed to be
effected by private agreements what they
have prohibited to be done by zoning. In a
somewhat analogous area, the enforcement
by the courts of private restrictions against
Negroes has been held to be unconstitu-
tional state action in Shelley v. Kraemer,31
but as yet the Supreme Court has not ex-
tended Shelley beyond the situation there
involved.
Private restrictions which allow commer-
cial establishments but prohibit the building
of churches have also been upheld. 32 It
seems that state action in such cases, when
considered in the light of the Shelley case,
could very well be considered an unconsti-
tutional denial of equal protection of the
laws. Certainly state enforcement of a pri-
vate agreement which excluded the churches
of one religion while permitting churches
of other faiths would present a situation
closely analogous to that in Shelley and
would call for the application of that doc-
trine.
municipal zoning ordinance preventing the build-
ing of churches in certain residential areas. Cor-
poration of the Presiding Bishop of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Porter-
ville, 338 U.S. 805 (1949)."
29 See, e.g., Smith v. First United Presbyterian
Church, 333 Mich. 1, 52 N.W.2d 568 (1952).
30 Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Sahlem, 254
N.Y. 161, 172 N.E. 455 (1930); Christ's Meth-
odist Church v. Macklanburg, 198 Okla. 297, 177
P.2d 1008 (1947).
it334 U.S. 1 (1948).
*12 Matthews v. First Christian Church of St.
Louis, 355 Mo. 627, 197 S.W.2d 617 (1946).
The central issue in determining the va-
lidity of a zoning ordinance excluding
churches has been the relation of the exclu-
sion to public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare. In applying such a test, the
attitude of .the courts has been that the un-
desirable effects of churches are outweighed
by the social value of such institutions.8 3
Courts are now going so far as to hold that
such a test has no meaning at all when ap-
plied to churches because "Such institutions
are regarded as occupying a status different
from other uses. ' '3 4 Thus the use of such a
test has so far defeated the purposes of
zoning with relation to churches and has
also led to inconsistent results.
5
Although zoning legislation which ex-
cludes churches has never been considered
in the light of the constitutional guaranty
of freedom of religion, cases involving simi-
lar legislation with respect to the free exer-
cise of religion have been decided explicitly
on constitutional grounds. 36 The instant case
of Congregation Temple Israel v. City of
Creve Coeur leans heavily on the strong
constitutional guaranty of freedom of reli-
gious worship to invalidate the zoning ordi-
nance requiring churches to obtain special
permits in order to build.3 There is a defi-
33 State ex rel. Synod of United Lutheran Church
v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E. 2d 515
(1942).
34 Brandeis School v. Village of Lawrence, 184
N.Y.S.2d 687, 695 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
3 Corporation of Latter-Day Saints v. City of
Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823,
appeal dismnissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949).
30Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951),
holding invalid as a prior restraint on the free
exercise of religion an ordinance requiring a per-
mit to conduct religious services on the street;
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1941),
holding invalid as a burden on the free exercise
of religion an ordinance requiring a license to
solicit funds for religious purposes.
37 320 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Mo. 1959).
nite public interest in the comfort and quiet
of the community and the Supreme Court
has allowed slight interference with First
Amendment freedoms where "the public in-
terest to be protected is substantial.13 8
Perhaps a more consistent balancing of
social interests would result if cases involv-
ing churches were considered on the funda-
mental constitutional basis of freedom of
religion. An approach to the problem on
such ground might help to accomplish the
purposes of zoning by validating the exclu-
sion of churches from limited residential
areas while invalidating their exclusion from
entire towns.
Recognition of Red China
in order to Deport Alien
Recently the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit sustained an
order granting a writ of habeas corpus
issued by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York re-
leasing the relator from the custody of the
Director of Immigration. Though conceding
that the relator is subject to deportation, the
Court concluded that such, deportation
under any of the subdivisions of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act was subject to
the condition that the country to which the
alien is sent should be "willing to accept
him into its territory." This entails a pre-
liminary inquiry as to the willingness of
said country to accept the alien. The Court
stated that this condition was still in effect
even if the "country" involved be Commu-
nist China, as was the case here, and even
if such condition necessitated de facto rec-
ognition of the Communist government.'
38 American Communications Assn., CIO v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 397-98 (1950).
1 United States ex rel. Tom Man v. Murff, 264
F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1959).
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Judicial review in the field of immigra-
tion and nationality is closely circumscribed;
Congress has vested in the executive branch
of government wide discretionary powers.
But this is not to say that the courts may
not intervene when an alien has been denied
due process. In the principal case, however,
the Court did not rule against the govern-
ment solely on the basis of a lack of due
process, but interpreted the appropriate
clause of the Immigration and Nationality
Act so as to nullify the decision of the
'Director of Immigration. In doing so it fol-
lowed the reasoning in the leading case of
United States ex rel. Leong Choy Moon
v. Shaughnessy.' In that case the court inter-
preted "country," in the same statute as is
here involved, to mean more than countries
legally recognized by the United States, but
any area or "place." '3
Perhaps the most important question that
this decision raises is the possible clash with
our government's policy of non-recognition
of Communist China. To answer this most
serious difficulty a few preliminary inquiries
must be determined. First, does this deci-
sion in effect force the United States to con-
fer de facto recognition? "Governments,"
a leading authority tells us, "are again clas-
sified, according to the opinion or belief of
the person using the term, into governments
de facto and de jure. A de facto government
is one actually existing in a state, and for
the time possessing sufficient strength to
exercise sovereign powers. . . . A de jure
government is one which the person using
the term believes to be the rightful govern-
ment of the state." 4
It would seem from the definition of a
2218 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1954).
JId. at 319.
4 DAvis, THE ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
34 (4th ed. 1916).
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de facto government that any act to be
considered conferring de facto recognition
would be an act which concedes that such
a government exists and exercises sovereign
powers.
There are many examples in American
history of situations in which the United
States was compelled or thought best to deal
with a government which it had not "rec-
ognized." '5 For example, the Government
dealt with the Huerta regime in Mexico,
going as far as* to demand from Huerta an
apology in the name of Mexico for the
Tampico incident, while still denying him a
de jure character as an official. 6 This was
also done in the case of the Soviet Govern-
ment in Russia, which was established in
1917, but was not given de jure recognition
by the United States until 1933, although
indirect and unofficial relations were carried
on during this interim period. 7 On the basis
of these and other occurrences it would
seem that formally requesting a country to
accept an alien would be an act tending to
confer de facto recognition, since the re-
quest must concede that the Communist
Government does exercise sovereign control.
The next preliminary question that must
be decided is whether an act of de facto
recognition in any way alludes to, or tends
to confer, de jure recognition.
It has been the practice of the United
States Government to require the fulfill-
ment of certain conditions by new govern-
ments as a prerequisite to recognition.8 This
general practice was described in a letter
written by Secretary Hughes to.labor leader
5 See FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 114-18 (2d
ed. 1934).
(;Id. at 117.
7Id. at 118-19.
8 1 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
174 (1940).
Samuel Gompers in 1923, explaining the
United States' position with regard to non-
recognition of the Soviet Union 9 After
having discussed de facto recognition and
all it entails, he states, "But while a foreign
regime may have securely established itself
through the exercise of control and the sub-
mission of the people . . . there still remain
other questions to be considered. Recog-
nition is an invitation to intercourse. It is
accompanied on the part of the new govern-
ment by the clearly implied or express
promise to fulfill the obligations of inter-
course. . . . In the case of the existing
regime in Russia . . . the sentiment of our
people is not deemed to be favorable to the
acceptance into political fellowship of this
regime so long as it denies the essential
bases of intercourse.' 10 The Secretary em-
phasized that it is quite possible to have
such relations with a government that
would, in effect, establish a de facto recog-
nition and yet be secure in the conclusion
that there are sound reasons for withhold-
ing de jure recognition. 1
In none of the numerous instances in
recent years, which in effect, bestowed de
facto recognition did such bestowal in any
way, via propaganda or otherwise, infringe
upon our policy of non de jure recognition.
But either because of, or in spite of, such de
facto acts, the United States did eventually
bestow de jure recognition on most of the
governments with whom it so dealt.
One might conclude, therefore, that such
acts are actually preludes to formal, legal
recognition. But if the criterion of de jure
recognition is "the rightful government, '12
9 Id. at 178-79.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 DAVIS, THE ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
34 (4th ed. 1916).
as Professor Davis suggests, or "intention to
fulfill obligations"' 3 as Secretary Hughes
states, or even if it is a combination of both,
is there in practice much difference between
de facto and de jure recognition? If coun-
tries under either term negotiate with one
another, fight one another, even trade with
one another, is there any significance to de
facto versus de jure?
The United States does not trade with
Red China. However, some of our allies,
such as England, do trade with her. We
negotiate with her; for example, in the
Warsaw meetings concerning the shelling of
the Quemoy Islands; we have fought her in
Korea; and we now are compelled to inquire
as to whether she will accept an alien held
by us. For all intents and purposes we have
bestowed de facto recognition on Red
China. Nevertheless, without discussing the
merits of non-recognition versus recognition
as a policy for the Government to follow, it
is suggested that such acts as these of de
facto recognition do not confer de jure
status with all its implications. These acts
are expedient, and are tolerated only be-
cause situations have arisen which have
required them.
Anti-Miscegenation Statute
A recent case from the Louisiana Su-
preme Court has once more turned the
spotlight of controversy on a basic issue
that has perplexed this country since the
earliest days of its founding. The defen-
dants in this case, one Negro and one white,
were convicted in the lower courts under
a Louisiana statute which punished "mar-
riage or habitual cohabitation, with knowl-
edge of their difference in race, between
a person of the Caucasian or white race
13 Supra note 9.
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and a person of the colored or negro
race."1
On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the statute,
but reversed on other grounds. State v.
Brown, 108 S. 2d 233 (La. Sup. Ct. 1959).
Article 79 of the Louisiana Criminal
Code is an anti-miscegenation statute typi-
cal of those found, altogether, in 25 states
of this nation.2 Most of these statutes are
found in the Southern states and date back
to before the time of the Civil War.' The
passing of the statutes closely paralleled
the appearance of the Negro in this country
and the spread of slavery in the South
before the Civil War. After the war and
during the subsequent period of rehabili-
tation, many of the statutes were repealed, 4
I LA. REV. STAT. § 14:79 (1950).
2 ALA. C6DE ANN. tit. 14, § 360 (1940); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 25-101 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 55-104 (1947); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90-1-2
(1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §101 (1953);
FLA. CONST. art. 16,§ 24; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.11
(1944); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-106 (1937); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 44-104 (1952); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 402.020 (1955); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 94
(West 1952); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 416
(1957); MIss. CONST. art. 14, § 263; MIss. CODE
ANN. § 459 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.020
(1949); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-103 (1943); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 122.180 (1957); N. C. CONST. art. 14,
§ 8; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3 (1950); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 12 (1954); S. C. CONST. art. 3,
§ 33; S. C. CODE § 20-7 (1952); TENN. CONST. art.
11, § 14; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-402 (1955); TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4607 (1951); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1953); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-54 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4701 (1955);
WYO. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 50-108 (1945).
3 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 546
(1957).
4 Iowa, 1851; Kansas, 1857; Maine, 1883; Massa-
chusetts, 1840; Michigan, 1883; Montana, 1953;
New Mexico, 1866; North Dakota, 1955; Ohio,
1877; Oregon, 1951; Rhode Island, 1881; South
Dakota, 1957; Washington, 1867.
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but those in the South remained and are
still uniformly upheld today by Southern
courts in spite of mounting pressure for
their abolition.5
Statutory definitions of miscegenation
itself vary immensely from state to state.
In general, it consists of any mixture of
the races in marriage, adultery or fornica-
tion.6 Under earlier statutes, only members
of the white race were liable, and even
today the statutes are directed mainly
against white-non-white marriages. In-
cluded, however, among the races which
are prohibited from intermarrying are
American Indians,7 Chinese,8 Japanese,u
Mongolians,'0 Ethiopians, 1 "the Malay
race," 12 Hindus,13 "half-breeds,"'1 4 and the
"brown race."' 5
Some states attempt to define these ra-
5 See, e.g., Arizona: State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121
P. 2d 882 (1942); Colorado: Jackson v. City of
Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 124 P. 2d 240 (1942);
Mississippi: Miller v. Lucks, 203 Miss. 824, 36 So.
2d 140 (1948); Oklahoma: Eggers v. Olson, 104
Okla. 297, 231 Pac. 483 (1924); Virginia: Naim v.
Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E. 2d 749, remanded, 350
U.S. 891 (1955); afl'd, 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E. 2d
849, app. dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
6 Jackson v. State, 23 Ala. App. 555, 129 So. 306
(1927); Jones v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. 538
(1893).
7 N: C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3 (1950); S. C. CODE
§ 20-7 (1952).
8 NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-103 (1952).
1) NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-103 (1952).
10 NEV. REV. STAT. § 122.180 (1957); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-1-2 (1953); Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 50-108 (1945).
11 NEV. REV. STAT. § 122.180 (1957).
12 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (1956); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27 § 398 (1957); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 122.180 (1957); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2
(1953); WYO. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 50-108 (1945).
13 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (1956).
14 S. C. CODE § 20-7 (1952).
'
5 NEV. REV. STAT. § 122.180 (1957) (recently
ruled unconstitutional).
cial terms (which sociologists themselves
admit are extremely elusive of definition)
in the language of Mendelian heredity."0
In the past, other states defined the various
degrees of descendancy and "admixture of
the blood" necessary to bring a person
within a race;'" still others attempt no defi-
nition of these terms at all. The entire area
is one of considerable confusion and un-
certainty. It is significant, however, that a
common feature of all the statutes is the
prohibiting in particular of negro-white
cohabitation and marriage. In addition to
the prohibition of marriage, many far-
reaching civil and criminal penalties are
attached to the statutes.' 8
The constitutionality of these anti-
miscegenation statutes has been assailed on
several different grounds. Catholic parties
16 See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. 23, § 11. See also
note 17 infra.
17 See, e.g., CODE OF ALA., § 4189 as construed in
Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882): "If any
white person and any negro, or the descendant of
any negro to the third generation, inclusive, though
one ancestor of each generation was a white per-
son..." (The reference to degree of generation is
no longer part of the statute.)
18 Some states make the marriage void ab initio,
see, e.g., ARK. STAT. § 55-104 (1947) and bar the
defense of marriage in rape, cohabitation, and
vagrancy prosecutions. See, e.g., Jackson v. City of
Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 124 P. 2d 240 (1942).
The children of miscegenous marriage may be
declared illegitimate, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.11
(1944), and their property rights thereby affected.
Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 297, 231 Pac. 483
(1924). Closely akin to anti-miscegenation sta-
tutes, and often included with them in discussions
of constitutionality, are those inflicting severer
penalties on certain criminal acts when committed
by a person not of the white race. Pace v. Ala-
bama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882); In re Opinion of the
Justices, 207 Mass. 601, 94 N.E. 558 (1911);
Bailey v. State, 239 Ala. 2, 193 So. 873, mandate
conformed to, 29 Ala. App. 161, 193 So. 871
(1940).
have successfully contended that such a
statute violated their freedom of religion. 19
It has also been argued that the prohibi-
tions are essentially discriminatory in na-
ture, violate the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution, and
impair the contract obligations of the
parties to the ,marriage.2 0
The statutes have been constitutionally
upheld on the ground that they constitute
a proper exercise of the power of a state
to make laws regulating the marriage of
its own subjects. 2 1 Ultimately, this power
rests on the nature of marriage not only
as a contract, but as a status affecting the
welfare of the state.22 The state can there-
fore pass laws reasonably regulating mar-
riage for the public health, morals, or
general welfare of the community, pro-
vided that such legislation has a legitimate
legislative end and is not discriminatory,
irrational, or expressive of popular preju-
dice. 23
For instance, the state can regulate mar-
riages of feeble-minded persons or of per-
sons with communicable diseases. In each
19 Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P. 2d 17
(1948). In a lengthy and historic 4-3 decision, the
Court evaluated legal, biological, sociological and
moral points and struck down a California mis-
cegenation statute - the first time in this country
such a statute has been held unconstitutional by a
state court of last resort. The case is commented
on in Riley, Miscegenation Statutes - A Re-Evalu-
ation of Their Constitutionality in Light of Chang-
ing Social and Political Conditions, 32 So. CAL.
L. REV. 28 (1958) and DOHERTY, MORAL PROB-
LEMS OF INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE 136-42 (1949).
20 Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877).
21 Perez v. Lippold, supra note 19, 198 P. 2d at 21;
Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E. 2d 749 (1955).
22 Stevens v. United States, 146 F. 2d 120 (10th
Cir. 1944); Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877).
23 Perez v. Lippold, supra note 19, 198 P. 2d at
18-19, 36.
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case, the relationship between the prohibi-
tion and the legislation must be and is
supported by known, obvious or demon-
strable scientific proof that such marriages
constitute a present or potential danger to
society. The legislative objective must be
reasonable, and there must be a reasonable
connection between the legislation and the
end sought.24
In the constitutional area, it has been
said that every free man has a fundamental
right to marry and that this right includes
the freedom to choose his marriage part-
ner.25 While its exercise is subject to rea-
sonable regulation by the state on proven
grounds of the common welfare, the right
to marry is also a civil right and is therefore
within the scope of the equal protection of
the laws clause of our Constitution. 2 As
both a civil and a fundamental right, there-
fore, the right to marry is also subject to
the prohibitions against classification by
race as these have been defined by the
24 Ibid.
25 Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P. 2d 17
(1948); see Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. William-
son,316 U.S. 535 (1942).
26 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
"The purpose of the (equal protection) clause...
was to prevent hostile and discriminating State
legislation against any person or class of persons.
.. Equality of protection under the laws implies
• ..that in the administration of criminal justice
[a person] shall not be subjected, for the
same offense, to any greater or different punish-
ment." Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 584
(1882). Unfortunately, the Court did not follow
its own reasoning, holding constitutional a statute
imposing a severer penalty for adultery when one
of the parties was colored. The Court apparently
was concerned only with the evils of adultery and
never even considered intermarriage, although the
case is often erroneously cited in this regard. For
the classic statement of the nature of the clause
as it affects the rights of the Negro, see Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490 (1954).
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Supreme Court.27
There can be no prohibition of marriage
except for an important social objective and
by reasonable means.... Legislation infring-
ing such rights must be based upon more
than prejudice and must be free from oppres-
sive discrimination to comply with the con-
stitutional requirements of due process and
equal protection of the laws.
28
It has often been argued by the state
courts, in upholding the constitutionality
of the statutes, that they do not violate the
equal protection clause since they are ap-
plied equally to all races.29 The penalty
provisions of the statutes, it is true, are
enforced equally on all the parties involved,
without regard to race. But it is the original
and general classification according to race,
the inclusion of the color element as con-
stituting a crime under the statute, that
violates the equal protection clause.30
27 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1872); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
The Supreme Court has never ruled squarely on
the subject of the constitutionality of anti-misceg-
enation laws, although the question has presented
itself twice. The Court refused certiorari in the
first case, Jackson v. Alabama, 37 Ala. App. 519,
72 So. 2d 114, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954),
and the second one, Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80,
87 S.E. 2d 749, remanded, 350 U.S. 891, aff'd 197
Va. 734, 90 S.E. 2d 849, appeal dismissed, 350
U.S. 985 (1956), went off on procedural grounds.
28 Perez v. Lippold, supra note 25, 198 P. 2d at 19.
See also Jackson v. Alabama, supra note 27 and
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948).
29 In re Paquet's Estate, 101 Or. 393, 399, 200
P. 911, 913 (1921). "The statute does not dis-
criminate. It applies alike to all persons, either
white, negroes, Chinese . . . or Indians." Pace v.
Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1882) (The punish-
ment of each offending person, black or white, is
the same.) See also Rogers v. State, 37 Ala. App.
638, 73 So. 2d 389 (1954); Jackson v. City of
Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 124 P. 2d 240 (1942).
30 Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 (1926);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
As Andrew D. Weinberger has said,
The choice of a spouse is a subjective act,
the act of individuals and not races. It would
therefore follow that a classification by
statute of those prohibited from marrying
each other must be made on an individual
basis and not on a group (racial) basis.31
The contention that such legislation is
meant to apply equally to both white and
black races in furtherance of the "separate
but equal" doctrine enumerated in Plessy
v. Ferguson32 has been discarded in a long
line of cases successively overruling more
and more important areas of segregation.3 3
Courts in support of the statutes further
argue that the racial classifications are rea-
sonable in view of the legislative objectives
of promoting the general peace, security,
and welfare.3 4 We have seen that the state's
power in this area rests on known scientific
proof of the imminent danger of certain
marriages to society. 35 In general accord-
31 Weinberger, A Reappraisal of the Constitution-
ality of Miscegenation Statutes, 42 CORNELL L. Q.
208, 215 (1957). See also Missouri ex rel. Gaines
v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The California
court said in Perez v. Lippold, supra note 25, at
20: "The right to marry is the right of individuals,
not of racial groups."
32 163 U.S.'537 (1896).
33 Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), affirm-
ing 142 F. Supp. 707 (D. Ala. 1956); Beal v.
Holcombe, 193 F. 2d 384 (5th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948); Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Edwards v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U.S. 60 (1917); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1880).
34 See the dissent by Shenk, J. in Perez v. Lippold,
supra note 25, at 35-36.
35 Weinberger, A Reappraisal of the Constitution-
allty of Miscegenation Statutes, 42 CORNELL L. Q.
208, 216 (1957).
ance with this fact, miscegenation statutes
were originally justified on purely "scien-
tific" grounds. Thus, it was thought that
the negro race was biologically inferior to
the white, and that miscegenous marriages
gave rise to biologically inferior offspring.3 6
Nor was this conclusion without scientific
background at the turn of the century, when
"racial purity," "racial strength" and "white
blood" were accepted scientific terms.37
Early investigations in this field tended to
"establish" the physical and intellectual
inferiority of the Negro by equating bio-
logical with sociological differences, and
the Southern courts quite understandably
seized on this evidence to support their
own conclusions of law.
The accumulation of scientific evidence
today, however, strongly indicates that
there is absolutely no biological inferiority
of one race to another, nor are offspring of
miscegenous marriages inferior in any bio-
logical sense.38 The deeply ingrained no-
tions of "corruption of blood" and "purity
of blood" have been shown to have no
36 Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869); State
v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883).
37 See, e.g., the scientific evidence quoted by the
dissent in Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198
P. 2d 17, 44-45 (1948), none of which is more
recent than 1926. Today it has been established
that Negro "inferiority" can be explained by differ-
ences in environment and social background rather
than biological, hereditary or racial deficiencies.
MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 144-153
(1944).
38MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 140-148
(1944); Weinberger, op. cit. supra note 36
at 218-221; CUSHING, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE 5;
MADIGAN, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE
NEGRO 23-24, (1941); ASHLEY-MONTAGU, MAN'S
MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE
120 (1945). See also 58 YALE L. J. 472, 474-76,
(1949).
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sound biological foundation.3 9
Despite the overwhelming conclusions of
fair, sound, and objective scientific study to
the contrary, the idea that some races are
biologically inferior still persists. 0 The
courts, however, no longer rely heavily on
the earlier biological studies. Today, pro-
hibitions against interracial marriage are
primarily social and psychological rather
than biological, but the uneasy feeling per-
sists that these are simply modern-day
rationalizations of the older, prejudices. 41
Absent any biological basis for the mis-
cegenation statutes, it would still be pos-
sible for the state, in promoting the general
welfare, to regulate marriage for the pur-
pose of combatting urgent and pressing
sociological danger or to relieve unbearable
tension between the races. 42 It has been
reasoned in this connection that:
. . . the necessity for them [segregation
statutes] grows out of social habits and tra-
ditions of the Southern States and the situa-
tion of our people relative to the colored
race, and the absolute and unchanging neces-
sity of keeping the races separate.43
While it is true that numerous social
problems and tensions exist in the segre-
gated areas, there is, in fact, little tension
between the races in the area of misce-
339TWOMEY, How TO THINK ABOUT RACE 39
(1951).
40 Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 90, 87 N.E. 2d 749,
756 (1956); State v. Brown, 108 So. 2d 233, 234
(Sup. Ct., La. 1959).
41 Story v. State, 178 Ala. 98, 103, 59 So. 480,
482, (1912); CUSHING, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE 5-6.
See also the court's language in State v. Brown,
108 So. 2d 233 (1959).
42 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917).
This is becoming the most frequently used reason.
43 Chaires v. City of Atlanta, 139 S.E. 559, 565
(Sup. Ct. Ga. 1927). See also Story v. State, 178
Ala. 98, 103, 59 So. 480, 482 (1912); State v.
Brown, 108 So. 2d 233, 235 (Sup. Ct., La. 1959).
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genation. 4 4 From a practical legislative
viewpoint, the entire field of intermarriage
is relatively unimportant. Miscegenous mar-
riages are comparatively rare in the South,
and a conviction is had under an anti-
miscegenation statute only where the parties
are either ignorant of the law or lack the
train fare to another state.
Moreover, as has been statistically
shown, neither race has the desire to inter-
marry. 41 Miscegenous marriages are rare,
individual, and personal happenings. They
have never taken place on a large scale,
and it is doubted that they ever will. Grad-
ual and almost complete intermixture in
-the course of thousands of years is indeed
a probability, but one of absolutely no
practical significance today.
The small group affected by the statutes
is, in addition, the least potent social in-
terest. Intermarriage itself, the most feared
outcome of integration by the whites in the
South, is the least important issue fought
for by the Negro. 46 The problem occupies
inverse positions of importance between the
two races.
47
Whatever tensions do exist in this area
are caused and aggravated by the statutes
rather than being relieved by them. As was
44 Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P. 2d 17,
26 (1948).
45 MILLER, QUESTIONS ABOUT RACIAL SEGREGA-
TION 11 (1956). This is true even in integrated
areas. DOHERTY, MORAL PROBLEMS OF INTERRA-
CIAL MARRIAGE 11, 45, 116-118 (1949). Further-
more, it is doubtful whether the statutes are
effective at all in preventing intermarriage. Perez
v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P. 2d 17, 35
(1948). Rather, they encourage concubinage, emi-
gration, and extra-marital relations. DOHERTY,
supra at 133-134; 36 YALE L. J. 862 (1927).
46 Weinberger, A Reappraisal of the Constitution-
ality of Miscegenation Statutes, 42 CORNELL L. Q.
208, 210 (1957).
47 Ibid.
said in the Perez case,
It is no answer to say that race tension can
be eradicated through the perpetuation by
law of the prejudices that give rise to the
tension. 48
It is also difficult to conceive how the legis-
lative objectives of peace and security can
be attained by the suppression of basic
human rights guaranteed by the Consti-
tution:
Desirable... and important as is the pres-
ervation of the public peace, this aim cannot
be accomplished by laws or ordinances
which deny rights created or protected by
the Federal Constitution.49
While it is true that there may be great
social pressure brought to bear on the par-
ties of a miscegenous marriage, and that the
children may be "unacceptable" either in
colored or in white society, the parties are
generally aware of this, and the cohtention
that such pressure was ample justification
for a miscegenation statute has been rejected
by the California Supreme Court as an im-
proper area for either the legislative or ju-
dicial functions.5 0 Social acceptability is, at
best, a transient factor that depends as much
on appearance, health, wealth, and individu-
ality as it does on color. Such social accept-
ance cannot and should not be legislated."'
Perhaps the most sensible attitude mani-
fest toward the entire problem in its many
48 Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P. 2d 17,
25 (1948).
49 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917).
50 Perez v. Lippold, supra note 48, 198 P. 2d at 29,
30, 33.
51 Several state constitutions provide that a citi-
zen's social status shall never be the subject of
legislation. It has nevertheless been held because
of this that the legislature is forever powerless to
repeal former miscegenation laws. Scott v. State,
39 Ga. 321 (1869).
aspects has been that of the Church. The
Church does not believe that one race is in-
ferior to another, or that children of mis-
cegenous marriages are inferior to others.52
For these reasons, she has never prohibited
miscegenous marriages. 53
However, the Church in its wisdom is
cognizant of the sometimes unbearable so-
cial pressures brought to bear on the part-
ners and children of an intermarriage.
Pastors and personal confessors will often,
for the parties' own sake, advise against the
marriage because of these social considera-
tions.5 4 But the marriage itself is in no wise
prohibited. Ultimately, the Church leaves
the problem with the parties themselves, as
a matter of personal discretion and pru-
dence. 55
In the final analysis, it must be conceded
that this attitude is the more intelligent and
practical one. The area of miscegenous mar-
riages should be relegated, properly, to the
exercise of personal prudence. To punish
innocent parties to the marriage institution
- on which the state is ultimately founded
- because of an arbitrary element of color
is to violate the fundamental precepts of
our Constitution and the morality of all
mankind.
52 DOYLE, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IS COLOR-
BLIND 3; DELOS, RACE: NATION: PERSON 60
(1944). Discrimination can be sinful in certain
circumstances, as when it is founded on con-
scious hate and an irrational belief in racial
superiority rather than a genuine and sincere be-
lief in discriminatory measures as proper or neces-
sary from the standpoint of health or sociology.
53 MILLER, QUESTIONS ABOUT RACIAL SEGREGA-
TION 11 (1956); TWOMEY, HOW TO THINK ABOUT
RACE 39 (1951); RYAN & BOLAND, CATHOLIC
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICS 332 (1940).
54 DOHERTY, MORAL PROBLEMS OF INTERRACIAL
MARRIAGE 34 (1949); LA FARGE, THE RACE QUES-
TION AND THE NEGRO 195-8 (1945).
55 O'Gara, Integration, Why?, 8 THE SIGN (Nov.
1958).
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Right to Vote
That the right to the exercise of the voting
franchise should be affected by a citizen's
race is shocking to most Americans today.
If it were necessary to clarify this point,
it would seem that the constitutional amend.-
ments during the period of Reconstruction
following the Civil War should have settled
the issue. Yet the motive behind the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 19571 and the
recent case of United States v. Alabama,2
brought under that Act, are forceful remind-
ers that the "racial criterion" is yet a very
real one.
An action was brought by the United
States Attorney General pursuant to pro-
visions of the Civil Rights Act against the
State of Alabama, the County Board of
Registrars and two members of the Board
for preventative relief against interference
with the right to vote of certain citizens of
the United States,, who weie of the Negro
race. The action did not survive a motion
to dismiss on the ground of failure of par-
ties. The District Court held that the State
of Alabama and the Board of Registrars
were not "persons" within the meaning of
the Act. Mo'reover, since the two named
members of the Board had resigned prior to
the institution of the action, they were not,
as individuals, proper party defendants.
The fact that the Civil Rights Act deals
with concepts deeply embedded in the po-
litical philosophy of our government em-
phasizes the significance of cases construing
it. The right of free choice which a citizen
has in the selection of the body which is to
govern him is important not only as a means
171 STAT. 634 (1957), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971 (Supp. 1958). Hereinafter cited as Civil
Rights Act.
2 171 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Ala. 1959).
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of insuring that that body shall have the
strength of popular support, but also to
make certain that the governing body will
consider the citizen's rights.3
To determine the degree to which the
Fourteenth Amendment delimits and guar-
antees this fundamental principle of demo-
cratic government, one must consider the
interpretation by the U. S. Supreme Court
of the scope of the "privilege and immuni-
ties" clause of the Federal Constitution. 4
The states have the power to regulate the
privileges and immunities of their citizens,
yet in so legislating they may do nothing to
abridge privileges and immunities arising
by virtue of an individual's United States
citizenship. 5
"State action" within the meaning of the
amendment comprehends not only an of-
ficial act of the legislative, executive or
judicial branches, but extends to every de-
partment of the state and every officer or
agent through whom the state acts.6 More-
over, the act of an individual officer may be
state action even though the officer acts
contrary to, or in excess of, his authority
since "misuse of power, possessed by virtue
of state law and made possible only because
the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority
of the state is action taken 'under color of'
state law."7
I Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387, 392 (4th Cir.
1947).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States .. "
5 Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935). Accord,
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1873), holding that only rights of national citi-
zenship received protection of the privileges and
immunities clause.
6 See Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317 (1917).
7 Baldwin v. Morgan, 251 F.2d 780, 786 (5th Cir.
1958).
The scope of the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment s is similar
to that of the privileges and immunities
clause. Hence in the area of civil rights, and
in particular with regard to the administra-
tion of the voting process, the action of
election boards or registrars to whom such
administrative power is delegated is "state
action."o
While it is clear that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the exercise of the
right to vote, this fundamental right is spe-
cifically assured by the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. "The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude." 10 This amendment has given to
citizens of the United States a new constitu-
tional right in exempting them from dis-
crimination in the exercise of the elective
franchise on grounds of race. While the
right to vote may come from the state, the
right to its exercise free from racial dis-
crimination comes from the federal govern-
ment.1 1 Whatever doubt there may be in
other areas of civil rights, it is thus settled
that the right to vote in any election is
guaranteed to every otherwise qualified citi-
zen without regard to his race or color.12
But the substantive content of a right and
s U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
9 Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227
U.S. 278 (1913).
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
11 Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904). "The
privilege to vote in any State is not given by the
Federal Constitution, or by any of its amend-
ments .... It may not be refused on account of
race, color or previous condition of servitude, but
it does not follow from mere citizenship of the
United States." Id. at 632.
12 Reddix v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1958).
the elements of its violation are frustratingly
academic unless a remedy for such violation
is available. The Fifteenth Amendment
states: "The Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion." Congress has implemented this
amendment by the adoption of the Civil
Rights Act of 1957, specifically section
1971.13
The background of civil rights legislation
presents a disturbing picture of the workings
of the election systems of some states. The
poll tax, the white primary laws, and liter-
acy laws requiring registrants to read, write,
and interpret any article of the Constitution
submitted to them by the Board of Regis-
trars are either directed toward or tend to
effect discriminatory registration. 14 The fact
that only twenty-five per cent of Negroes of
voting age are registered in eleven Southern
states is, to say the least, suspicious." It
cannot be seriously contended that there is
no need for effective civil rights legislation.
The Civil Rights Act of 1957 is not a
product of haste but an act skillfully devel-
oped after much controversy and extended
hearings.16 The substantive content of the
act is merely a reiteration of rights spe-
cifically or inferentially guaranteed by the
Constitution. Like its predecessors, it pro-
hibits any deprivation of voting rights by
state officers or those acting under the au-
33 Civil Rights Act § 1971. The Civil Rights Act
was passed in a proper exercise of power delegated
to the federal government. See In re Wallace, 170
F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ala. 1959).
14 N. Y. Times, June 21, 1959, § 6 (Magazine),
p. 5. Veteran Negro college teachers had been
refused registration for failing literacy tests. Id.
at 22.
15 Id. at 22.
16 Lane, The Civil Rights Act of 1957, 4 How.
L. J. 36 (1958).
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thority of law.17 The present act adds that
"no person, whether acting under color of
law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten,
coerce . . . any other person. . . ." for the
purpose of interfering with his right to
vote.18
The substantive provisions of the Act are
limited by the fact that "person" under the
statute relates only to acts done by indi-
viduals. 9 This limitation was emphasized
by the Court in the principal case, and as
the principal case indicates, has the effect
of restricting the efficacy as well as the
scope of the Act.
The core of the legislation is its pro-
cedural content. The federal government,
acting through the Department of Justice,
is authorized to institute action in order to
secure the free exercise of an individual's
right to vote in federal elections and to pre-
vent discriminatory restriction of the right
to vote in state electidns. 20
The authority of Congress to empower
the Attorney General to restrain a private
individual not acting in any official capacity
from interfering with participation in an
17 See Civil Rights Act § 1971 (a).
18Civil Rights Act § 1971 (b). See Legislative
History, 1957 United States Code Congressional
and Administrative News, 1966, 1977. (Emphasis
added.)
19 Ibid. In Hewitt v. City of Jacksonville, 188
F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1951 ), "person" did not include
a state or its governmental subdivisions acting in
their sovereign, as distinguished from their pro-
prietary, capacity.
20 "Whenever any person has engaged or there are
reasonable grounds to believe that any person is
about to engage in any act or practice which would
deprive any other person of any right or privilege
secured by subsection (a) or (b) of this section,
the Attorney General may institute . . . a civil
action or other proper proceeding for preventive
relief .. " Civil Rights Act § 1971 (c).
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election is not clear.21 Perhaps this power
may be inferred from Article I Section 4 of
the Federal Constitution. The constitution-
ality of this authorization must await court
construction.
Essentially then, the Civil Rights Act pro-
vides for a cheap, speedy and effective
remedy where a citizen's right to vote is
violated in a discriminatory manner. The
United States Government bears the cost of
the proceedings;2 2 the injunctive remedy in-
sures that the voter may participate in the
electoral process. Further, temporary in-
junctions may be granted. Finally, it is not
necessary to exhaust the state administra-
tive remedies, for the district courts have
jurisdiction "without regard to whether the
party aggrieved shall have exhausted any
administrative or other remedies that may
be provided by law."'2
3
The principal case casts some doubt
upon the efficacy of the Act. While it may
be unfortunate that the State of Alabama
and the County Board of Registrars are not
proper party defendants since neither is a
"person," such is the clear intention of the
Act. This unhappy result is particularly
frustrating in the case of the Board. Clearly
it is the Board, acting through its members,
which denies registration; it is the Board
which has continuous control over its rec-
ords; and it is in a suit against the Board
that the most effective remedy could be
obtained.
The citizen, deprived of his right to vote,
2171 HARV. L. REV. 573 (1958). See also, Com-
ment, 56 MICH. L. REV. 619 (1958). The control
of the United States over individual action is based
on activity under color of law.
22 Civil Rights Act § 1971 (c).
23 Civil Rights Act § 1971 (d).
has an effective remedy against the official
who caused the deprivation if, as the prin-
cipal case points out, the defendent is still
in office. Further, where the officer resigns
after the action has been initiated, his suc-
cessor may be substituted as a party defen-
dant pursuant to Rule 25 (d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 24 Where, how-
ever, the position of the officer is termi-
nated, as here, prior to the institution of the
action, there is no party defendant. It is
submitted that the result - the necessity of
a further attempt to register - is not only
cumbersome but also may result in a delay
sufficient to disenfranchise the aggrieved
party with respect to an election following
immediately upon the registration period.
Unless the provision of the Act authorizing
preventative relief where there are "reason-
able grounds to believe" that any person is
about to engage in an act which would de-
prive a citizen of his right to vote25 may be
used to obtain at least temporary relief
against the remaining Board members so
that the citizen may be allowed to vote in
an imminent election, the result of tempo-
rary disenfranchisement is inescapable.
However, it is difficult to see how the "provi-
sion would help in the hypothetical case
presented: what facts would be alleged upon
which a court could base a determination
that there are such reasonable grounds;
could the Board's records be obtained and
24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 (d). "[W]hen an officer of
the United States . . . a State, county, city, or
other governmental agency, is a party to an action
and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise
ceases to hold office, the action may be continued
and maintained by or against his successor. .. ."
25 Civil Rights Act § 1971 (c). Under the authority
of Reddix v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1958),
each individual action must be brought separately
since a class action cannot be maintained.
analyzed with sufficient speed; would not
the court be wary of giving relief in haste
where there is a possibility that the citizen
is not qualified and was refused registration
in the proper exercise of clear right of the
state to regulate the exercise of voting
rights?
It is submitted that the Civil Rights Act
of 1957 falls far short of its purposes. How-
ever, this effort by the Legislature to provide
effective protection for citizens' voting rights
is encouraging. Moreover, the establishment
by the Act of the Civil Rights Commission
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to investigate claims of discriminatory prac-
tices in this area and to scrutinize the devel-
opment of civil rights legislation 26 bodes
well for more effective future legislation.*
26 Civil Rights Act § 1975. See generally Com-
ment, 56 MICH L. REV. 619, 627.
* After completion of this article, the report of a
Georgia District Court decision was published
wherein the court held that the Civil Rights Act of
1957 was unconstitutional on the ground that the
Congress has no power to prohibit or punish purely
individual and private actions depriving another
of his right to vote on account of his race or color.
U.S. v. Raines, 172 F. Supp. 552 (A.D. Ga. 1959).
See note 21 and accompanying text. [Ed. note]
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(Continued)
inquiries related to: (1) Protection afforded
the religion of the child's natural mother
or that of the child himself. (2) The effect
of a mixed marriage on a party's application
for adoption. (3) The- extent of inquiry into
the applicant's church membership and
church attendance. (4) Applications for
adoption made by agnostics and atheists.
The results of the survey indicate that
the agencies are more diligent in their in-
quiries into religious matters than are the
courts. However, neither group felt disposed
to having children adopted by either atheists
or agnostics.
A little further on in the article, the
authors show a leaning toward the view that
religion has no appreciable influence on a
person's behavior, while chiding J. Edgar
Hoover for his statements to the contrary.
Here they rely in part on a comparative
study made of eleventh grade girls in public
and parochial schools, with regard to cheat-
ing on examinations. Some reliance was also
placed on the claims of religious belief and
profession made. by juvenile delinquents
and convicted criminals.
With respect to the grade school children,
cheating on examinations, although de-
plored, is no complete test of the relation-
ship of religion to behavior. Secondly, might
not one question whether the public school
children were devoid of religious training
in view of Sunday school, released time and
other programs? With respect to the claims
made by delinquents and convicted crimi-
nals, might not one. take the position that
these people might have some stake in
putting a best foot forward in view of their
position at the moment? Secondly, might
not their religious attestations be a mere
reflection of the fact that few men in society
are professed atheists?
Despite these shortcomings, the lawyer
handling an adoption problem and the
reader interested in the general subject will
find worthwhile material in the article. 0
